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Abstract 
Negotiations leading to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have dominated the 
diplomacy of global development in the past years. The paper looks at the actions and 
motivations of a relatively new development actor, Hungary, which co-chaired the UN 
General Assembly’s Open Working Group on SDGs, and thus had a highly visible position 
during the talks. Hungary had a key priority of having an SDG on water related issues, driven 
mainly by its perceived comparative advantage in the sector. Using the insights of the 
literature on small state influence in multilateral negotiations, the paper argues that 
Hungarian diplomats used alliance building as well as reputational and framing strategies to 
counter the structural disadvantages of the country’s small state status, and were successful in 
shaping the final outcome. However, the Hungarian government did not act out of a strong 
commitment to sustainable global development, but rather used the forum to brand itself as 
an expert on water issues, with the hope of future business benefits. 
 
Keywords: Sustainable Development Goals, Post-2015, Hungary, small state influence, 
United Nations; foreign aid.
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1. Introduction 
In September 2015, members of the United Nations (UN) agreed on the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), a set of targets to replace the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), which had served as the main point of reference for the international development 
system between 2000 and 2015. The SDGs are more ambitious and broader than their 
predecessors, with a total of 17 goals and 169 targets. As opposed to the MDGs, which had a 
clear overarching message of poverty reduction, the SDGs are much more fragmented, and 
critics have pointed out that this is likely to have an impact on their ability to generate 
political will for development (Easterly 2015). While the MDGs grew out of a set of goals 
formulated by technocrats at the OECD (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011), the process of 
creating the SDGs was much more politicized and inclusive to begin with, with the diplomats 
of UN member states being in charge of the process, but societal voices also being channelled 
in through various multi-stakeholder forums and UN-led consultation mechanisms (such as 
the World We Want 2015 campaign). Following the decision to focus the new development 
system on sustainability at the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, and a report by a High Level 
Panel of Eminent Persons in March 2013, the negotiations on the SDGs began in March 
2013, with the first session of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on 
Sustainable Development Goals (OWG). This process allowed for a large variety of voices 
and interests, and a clear need emerged to accommodate as many of these as possible in order 
to ensure wide ranging support for the new goals.2  
Studying the negotiations leading to the SDGs, and the actions and interests of various UN 
member states during the process can reveal important insights into the diplomacy of global 
development, as shown by the topic’s emerging research agenda (Kim and Kang 2015; Dodds 
et al. 2017). This paper contributes to this agenda by looking at the actions and motivations 
of one state, Hungary, focusing on the OWG process. Hungary, although a small country, is 
relevant for three reasons. First, it is a relatively new development partner and donor, and as 
such can be seen as representative of other small new development actors, both in Europe and 
beyond.3 Second, the Hungarian government has been making conscious efforts to ‘open to 
the world’ and become a more assertive international player, which includes strengthening 
trade and development relations with developing countries, and, more generally, asserting 
‘Hungarian national interests’ in international negotiations. Third, Hungary’s UN ambassador 
acted as co-chair of the OWG, and as such had a highly visible position throughout the 
process.  
This context suggests that Hungary could have played an important role in the OWG process, 
potentially even punching above its weight. The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate the 
interests and actions of Hungary in this process, and examine the strategies used by the 
government to influence the outcome. The paper builds on the theoretical insights of the 
literature on the influence and strategies of small states in international negotiations. For the 
                                            
2 For an overview of the OWG process see Bhattacharya et al. (2014 ) and Dodds et al. (2017). 
3 For research on the strong similarities (and also differences) between emerging European donors, see Szent-
Iványi and Lightfoot (2015). 
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purposes of this paper, influence is defined as the correlation between the preferences of the 
small state and the final policy outcome (Nasra 2011: 165). Small states face severe structural 
limitations due to their size and resources in influencing international negotiations, and need 
to rely on various counter-balancing strategies to make up for these deficiencies. Many 
different strategies have been put forward in the literature, but they can generally be grouped 
into three main types: (1) bargaining and alliance building, (2) normative suasion, and (3) 
reputation building, with small states often using a mix of these (Thorhallson 2006; Nasra 
2011; Panke 2012). 
Based on the analysis of government and OWG documents, official statements, ten 
qualitative interviews with Hungarian diplomats and representatives of civil society 
organizations,4 as well as participant observation on a government consultation event in 
September 2013, the paper reveals that Hungary formulated a clear, yet relatively narrow 
goal for the SDGs: the inclusion of water-related issues as an individual goal. The diplomats 
involved in the process mainly used a combination of alliance building and reputational 
strategies, by presenting Hungary as an authoritative expert on water, taking the lead in other 
UN forums on the issue, getting other countries on board, and also acting as a neutral and 
effective mediator as the co-chair of the OWG. This combination proved to be successful, 
despite the fact that the wider Hungarian government remained generally uninterested in the 
SDG process, and did not increase capacities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide 
support. In fact, the wider government seems to have been less concerned about the contents 
of the SDGs overall, and more interested in using the OWG as a means to improve the 
country’s image among emerging economies, where it sought business opportunities. More 
precisely, taking a leading role in the OWG process can thus be seen as a branding exercise, 
with the goal of framing Hungary as an expert in water issues, with the hope of future 
business benefits. 
The relevance of these findings goes beyond Hungary. First, it shows how diplomats of 
relatively small states can influence international negotiations using creative strategies, even 
if their government provides little additional resources. Second, it contributes to our 
understanding of how states negotiate to create norms in the international development 
system, and how they can use these forums for their own branding purposes. Third, it 
questions some findings of the literature on the international development policies of the new 
EU members (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot 2015), which generally tend to argue that the new 
members have little capacities, and even little desire to influence European and other 
multilateral development policies, not to mention the evolution of global development norms. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two briefly reviews the literature 
on small state influence in international negotiations. This is followed in section three by a 
discussion of Hungary’s foreign and development policy, with the aim of providing context. 
                                            
4 Unless otherwise noted, interviews were conducted in person. To ensure that interviewees were not influenced 
by their superiors or colleagues, questions were not made available beforehand. In order to cross-check 
statements of government officials, a number of representatives from civil society organisations were also 
interviewed. For reasons of confidentiality, all interviewees remain anonymous. 
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Section four presents evidence on Hungarian’s actions during the OWG process and how 
these relate to the insights from small state theory. Section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Small states and the diplomacy of international development 
The study of the role and influence of small states in international negotiations has a long 
tradition in the international relations literature, going back at least to the 1960s (see the 
classic paper by Keohane 1969). The overwhelming majority of the more recent literature 
focuses on the influence of small states in the European Union (Archer and Nugent 2006; 
Panke 2010; Nasra 2011), but many insights from these studies are applicable to other 
contexts, such as the UN or the WTO as well (Kassimeris 2009; Lee and Smith 2010; Panke 
2014; Nasra and Debaere 2016). The role of small states in forming the international 
development system has received relatively little attention. While there is a sizeable literature 
looking at small states as donors (Hoadley 1980; Pospisil and Khittel 2010; Lundsgaarde 
2013; Crandall and Varov 2016), it generally tends to focus on critical analyses of the 
bilateral development policies of these states, with little if any mention of their actions in 
multilateral development settings. The literature seems to give the impression that the 
international development system is formed mainly by large states, or going beyond a strictly 
realist perspective, international organizations (like the EU or the OECD DAC), norm 
entrepreneurs and ideas. Small states seem to hardly play any role. 
Many definitions abound in the literature on small states (see Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006; 
Maass 2009; Steinmetz and Wivel 2010: 4), but one key feature is that these states have 
disadvantages when it comes to international negotiations as compared to large states. 
Traditional realist approaches have conceptualised these disadvantages in terms of power and 
capacities and the material resources underpinning these (Steinmetz and Wivel 2010). Recent 
debates have focused on the usefulness of the concept of size. A useful working definition is 
offered by Steinmetz and Wivel (2010, 7), who see size as ‘defined through the relation 
between the state and its external environment’. Based on a study of Russia’s relationships 
with the Baltic states, Lamoreaux (2014) argued that size is not a variable that is useful when 
trying to understand and explain state behaviour. He found that big states could be argued to 
act like small states and vice versa. This prompted Crandall and Varov (2016) to update the 
definition of small states by adding psychological factors. They argue that a small state is one 
that perceives itself to be on the weaker side in an asymmetric relationship (see also Hey 
2003).  
These different approaches to defining small states are all useful when thinking specifically 
of a small donor like Hungary. Hungary clearly fits most of the traditional definitions of a 
small state (see Tulmets 2014). As a small donor, Hungarian can be characterised by (1) a 
low amounts of aid, (2) limited history of colonialism/developmentalism, (3) self-perception 
as, at the very least, a ‘premature donor’, and (4) lack of domestic interest in the topic of 
development aid (Szent-Iványi 2012).  
Within a UN context, the importance of raw power decreases as all countries are formally 
equal and have a single vote each, which in turn strengthens small states (Neumann and 
5 
 
Gstöhl 2004). Small states none the less have lower capacities to take part in negotiations in 
these contexts than large states do. They have lower staff numbers, lower abilities to retain 
talent in government, and have fewer contacts with experts and epistemic communities 
(Panke 2010: 801). They provide relatively lower amounts of foreign aid and are less 
important trading partners for developing countries than large states are, which decreases 
their ability for leverage and bargaining (Panke 2012). With lower capacities and resources, 
small states are often unable to cover all policy areas, and need to prioritize. In low priority 
policy areas, small states may even find it difficult to clearly formulate and articulate their 
interests.  
While more recent arguments in the literature do not deny the importance of material 
resources, they are more positive in assessing the potential small states have for influence by 
pointing towards the knowledge and expertise these states can bring, and their ability to shape 
policy outcomes through framing and discursive strategies (Nasra 2011). Perceptions on how 
states are seen by others and how they see themselves are also important, as they can turn into 
self-fulfilling prophecies on influence (Lee and Smith 2010). Archer and Nugent (2006) thus 
argue that size should not be understood as a deterministic factor, and rather it should be seen 
as one of the variables affecting the influence of a state in international negotiations.  
Indeed, small states can employ a wide range of strategies to counterbalance the structural 
disadvantages that their size places on them. The small state literature has traditionally 
pointed out that small states have a strong preference for international law, regimes and 
institutions (Neumann and Gstöhl 2004). As mentioned, contexts with well-established rules 
place constraints on large states, and thus relatively increase the influence of smaller states. 
These rule-based contexts provide states several opportunities to engage in various strategies 
to gain influence. Many different typologies of these strategies have been put forward. 
Realists, like Knudsen (1996), argue that small states can take advantage of tensions between 
large powers or develop good relations with the nearest large power. More recent approaches, 
focusing on institutionalized settings, are more relevant however. Nasra (2011) discusses 
strategies used by small states within the EU, which include taking a leading role during 
negotiations, building informal networks and alliances, bringing knowledge and expertise, 
and the ability to explain their position and persuade others. Panke (2012) emphasizes the 
importance of shaping strategies. Technical, scientific, or legal knowledge and expertise are 
key in using such strategies, as is the ability to frame or reframe negotiations.  
The paper adopts the typology of Panke (2010), as it includes the elements found in most 
other typologies, and is seen as the most suitable for understanding the actions of Hungary 
during the SDG process. This approach identifies three strategies: (1) bargaining and alliance 
building, (2) normative suasion using high quality arguments, and (3) reputation building. 
Bargaining and alliance building. Small states are generally seen to be in a weak position for 
bargaining, due to their inability to make credible threats. They can however counterbalance 
this by creating networks and alliances. Small states can group together on a regional basis, 
such as the Nordic states, the Visegrad states, or the ‘like-minded’ group of donors, or form a 
strategic partnership with a larger state. These forms of collective bargaining allow small 
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states to increase their leverage, but only if interests within the group are relatively 
homogenous.  
Normative suasion. Convincing other states through normative suasion requires the small 
state to put forward convincing, well-prepared positions and ideas, which require 
considerable attention and investment from the government. Indeed, Smith et al. (2005) 
argue that influencing discourses and generating ideas and solutions are one of the most 
important tools small states have to influence the international order, especially if these 
contribute to reframing the given debate. States however need to have the necessary 
technical, scientific, economic, legal etc. capacities to be able to formulate high quality 
arguments, or need to tap into expert networks and NGOs outside of the government. 
Reputation building. States can also build a reputation for themselves and their diplomats of 
being fair, neutral and interested in the common good. As argued by Panke (2010: 804) “[i]f 
small states have the reputation of being neutral, they can act as ‘impartial mediators’ 
between different bigger states or seemingly defend common interests and, thereby, 
systematically promote their own policy preferences […] through the backdoor.” States can 
also build their reputation by presenting themselves or their specific experts as being highly 
knowledgeable on a topic and having an excellent track record in it. Being perceived as 
neutral experts allows them to make use of institutional opportunity structures, such as 
serving as the chair of negotiations, which gives them the power to set the agenda, distribute 
position papers and frame arguments (Panke 2012: 396). Within international development, 
small states, typically with no colonial past, may actually be better suited to succeed in 
certain institutional settings as they can play the role of honest brokers. 
In practice, states may choose a combination of these strategies to maximise influence, 
although clearly not all variants are compatible with each other (see Arter 2000, Jakobsen 
2009, Grøn and Wivel 2011). Although all these article focus on the EU, given that there are 
many similarities between how the EU works in relation to foreign and defence policy (see 
Weiss 2017) and the nature of the UN system, it is argued their conclusions are relevant. 
These works have highlighted the need for small states to use different strategies in different 
stages of the negotiation process. In particular, the ability to shape an agenda in its early 
incarnations can be important for small states (see Farrell 2017 for a discussion of how the 
OWG shaped the subsequent SDG agenda).  
Which strategy a state chooses, and how actively it pursues it will in turn depend on a number 
of factors. All strategies require some degree of resources and capacities, and as mentioned 
above this is exactly what small states lack. Thus, an issue must be salient for a government 
for it to make a decision to prioritize it and devote resources to it. Salience may come from 
several domestic sources (Doeser 2011; Panke 2013). There may be strong public support for 
the topic, specific influential interest groups may be pushing for it, the government may want 
to project power and avoid looking ineffective, or it may want to use the issue for domestic 
reputational purposes (cf. Chandler 2007). 
Even if the government sees the issue as salient, the public administration of the country must 
be able to actually formulate a quality position and select the appropriate strategy. Indeed, 
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capacities and expertise on technical issues do not develop overnight after a government 
decision is made, and there is clearly a learning element involved (Panke 2010). Building 
alliances requires highly skilled diplomats who are familiar with a given multilateral setting. 
As mentioned, normative suasion requires a strong government commitment of capacities. 
Reputation building also has a time dimension, meaning that states need to be engaged in 
international negotiations on the topic in a consistent and high quality manner for some time 
for their reputational capital to build up.  
This brief overview of the literature shows that small states can have influence in 
international negotiations, and provides some theoretical insights on the strategies that a state 
like Hungary can employ to shape multilateral negotiations. The paper uses these insights to 
examine the strategies employed by Hungary in the OWG process in section 4, but first a 
brief overview of the domestic political context of Hungary’s foreign and international 
development policy is presented.  
 
3. The politics of foreign and development policy in Hungary 
In order to fully understand Hungary’s involvement in the SDG process, one must first look 
at how the priorities of Hungarian foreign relations changed after 2010, when the right-wing 
conservative Fidesz party won a landslide parliamentary majority and formed government, a 
feat which it repeated in 2014. The party, running on a nationalist-populist platform of 
economic self-rule, constructed an identity for itself as the protector of Hungarian interests, 
and successfully cast the previous socialist government as a servant of the interests of 
multinational capital and ‘Brussels’ (Johnson and Barnes 2014; Bozóki 2015). With a two-
thirds majority in Parliament, allowing it to modify the constitution, the Fidesz government 
enacted a number of fundamental changes and legislation. Many of these have attracted 
considerable international criticism from sources like the European Commission, the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe, and a number of other governments and civil society 
organizations. These criticisms relate to measures seen as limiting the freedom of speech and 
the media, curtailing the independence of the judiciary, increasing political corruption, as 
well as violations of other basic democratic principles, underlining the authoritarian 
tendencies of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (see Kornai 2015; Ágh 2016; Buzogány 2017). 
These tendencies have been exaggerated by the undermining of dissident voices in Hungary 
and by the creation of a ‘new, loyal business elite’ (Enyedi 2016: 15). This business elite and 
the governing elite identify that their interests align in the economic and foreign policies of 
Hungary.  
The discourse of Hungarian economic interests figures strongly in the Fidesz government’s 
foreign and development policies as well. The government’s official foreign policy strategy, 
adopted in 2011, is also placed in this context, and revolves around the theme of ‘Global 
Opening’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011; see also Tarrósy and Morenth 2013; Tarrósy and 
Vörös 2014; Jacoby and Korkut 2016). One of the main goals set out in this strategy is that 
Hungary needs to broaden and diversify its heavily EU-centric foreign relations, including its 
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external trade, with, among others, developing countries. As explained by a senior foreign 
ministry official: 
The purpose of Hungary’s foreign policy shift following 2010 was to awaken relationships with 
previously neglected countries, such as Mexico, Argentina and Turkey, etc., to expand foreign 
trade in such emerging economies, and to strengthen Hungary’s position around the world (Field 
2015). 
The strategy states that ‘[a]n important tool of our global opening is the strengthening of our 
activities within the UN, and our cooperation with other states within the framework of the 
UN’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). 
There is also an explicit emphasis on business and exports in the Global Opening policy 
(Törő 2013), which was made especially clear in mid-2014 when the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) was rebranded as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). The 
Orbán government has tended to view Europe’s ongoing economic crisis as a fundamental 
economic decline of the West in the face of strengthening new powers. In this view, even if 
growth recovered in the West, it would not provide enough resources and markets for 
Hungary to catch up economically. Therefore, to be able to develop, Hungary needs 
investment from other sources and needs to gain access to new markets to diversify its 
dependency (Jacoby and Korkut 2016; INT#02).  
Hungary’s international development policy has undoubtedly benefitted from the Global 
Opening, with some hailing the new strategic direction as a ‘new beginning’ for Hungary’s 
relations with the developing world (Tarrósy and Morenth 2013). Hungary started its 
international development policy in the run-up to the country’s EU accession in 2004 (Paragi 
2010), but following an initial stage of growth, the resources allocated for the policy were 
heavily cut back already after 2006 due to austerity measures and continued to remain low 
due to a prolonged budgetary crisis following the global economic crisis (Benczes 2011). The 
MFA’s budget for international development was slashed from HUF 1.4 billion (about 7 
million US dollars) in 2004 to 102 million (about half a million dollars) by 2011.5 
The withdrawal of funds was not the only problem the policy was facing. There was little 
political attention towards international development, and indeed by 2012 Hungary was the 
only country among the Central and Eastern European emerging donors which did not have a 
written strategy or legislation on international development. While many of the countries in 
the region enacted strong reforms in the area, successive Hungarian governments seemed 
unwilling to tackle the persistent organizational and effectiveness problems of the policy 
(INT#07; Szent-Iványi 2012). 
While international development policy receives only small explicit mentions in the 
government’s 2011 foreign policy strategy, emphasis on the need to re-invigorate relations 
with the developing world implicitly gave a big role to the policy area. Indeed, increased 
political attention towards development is clearly visible after the acceptance of the strategy. 
                                            
5 These numbers refer only to the MFA’s foreign assistance budget. Due to the increase in compulsory 
multilateral commitments, the total decrease in Hungary’s official development assistance figures was much less 
drastic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014: 38). 
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In March 2013, the Parliament called on the government to formulate a strategy for 
international development for 2014-2020. The MFA presented this document in mid-2013 
and the government approved it in early 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The 
strategy emphasized the importance of contributing to the Millennium Development Goals, 
‘or any UN framework that would succeed it’, as the main goal of Hungarian international 
development policy. The strategy also included a commitment from the government to 
gradually increase funding for international development, although it did not specify any 
targets. It also mentioned three priority sectors for Hungarian development assistance: 
institutional development, the green economy, and developing human resources. Business 
interests also figured strongly in the strategy in terms of ‘gaining markets for Hungarian firms 
and certain parts of the state sector (e.g. education and health), as well as supporting the 
development of Hungarian knowledge and technology’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014: 
15). Hungary had never previously published any strategic document for international 
development, thus the fact that such a document now exists is clear indication of stronger 
political attention towards the policy area (INT#01). The acceptance of the new strategy was 
soon followed up with the enactment of a long awaited law on international development 
(Act XC of 2014), which mainly codified the key principles and administrative procedures. 
There are other elements of evidence of the Global Opening strategy impacting development 
relations. The MFAT has opened or has announced plans to open several new embassies in 
developing countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, Ethiopia, Columbia and Peru. These were 
justified by the minister of foreign affairs and trade Péter Szijjártó as ‘allowing Hungary to 
benefit from the rapid economic growth in Africa and Latin America’, and follow ‘common 
sense to locate new markets besides [its] existing ones’ (MNO 2015).  
There is therefore clear evidence of increased attention towards the developing world and 
international development policy, justified mainly by business interests. Hungary’s 
engagement with the SDGs and work in the OWG can be seen as a direct consequence of this 
‘more global’ foreign policy, as well as the explicit strategic emphasis on becoming more 
active in the UN. The following section reviews Hungary’s activities in the OWG, and 
examines the strategies it used to counter its structural disadvantages.  
 
4. Hungary and the SDGs 
4.1. Hungary’s priority: water issues 
On the first session of the OWG on 14 March 2013, Hungary was elected co-chair of the 
OWG with acclamation alongside Kenya, and the two countries co-led the remaining 13 
sessions until the end of 2014, resulting in an outcome document with a proposal for 17 
sustainable development goals (Open Working Group 2015). The election of the two co-
chairs was driven by the principle that representatives of one developed and one developing 
country should share the responsibility. Originally, the aim was to have 30 members in the 
OWG (Future We Want 2012: 37), but in the end it turned out to be a highly unprecedented 
format of negotiations, including diplomats from almost all UN members in some form and a 
wide range of civil society and scientific actors (INT#05; INT#10). 
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Hungary formulated a relatively clear, if somewhat narrow goal related to what it would like 
to see in the final version of the SDGs well before the OWG began: the inclusion of water-
related issues, including water management and sanitation, as a standalone SDG, and to 
create an institutional process to implement, monitor and assess progress on this goal 
(Budapest Water Summit 2013a). Due to its experience in managing river flooding and an 
abundance of underground thermal waters, Hungary has long seen itself to have special 
expertise in water issues, which was perceived to constitute a comparative advantage for the 
country compared to other development partners (INT#02). The sector of water management 
has been a priority area of Hungary’s foreign and international development policies since 
2003 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006), and the emphasis on it was further strengthened in 
the 2014 international development strategy as part of the ‘green economy’ priority area 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2014). 
Emphasizing Hungary’s comparative advantage in water management issues, giving the 
sector such a strong position in the country’s international development policy and making it 
a goal in the SDG negotiations is at least partly driven by business motivations. This is 
summed up well by an interviewee (INT#04): 
When we identify a goal [relating to the] full hydrological cycle in the world, with good intention, 
then we’ve already defined the market segments where investments will occur. […] When I define 
the Hungarian list of priorities as such, that means that we can make a prognosis in which of these 
segments Hungarian market actors will have a niche. If there is none, then Hungary cannot be 
present as a trend setter in the world, as an owner of a technology, a supplier. It could only be 
present as a consumer, probably on a lower level of the global chain. 
This statement also provides some insight into the motivations of Hungary for focusing on 
water issues. Beyond a certain degree of path dependency caused by previous commitments 
to water issues, the statement shows the importance of business interests. Defining an 
international development framework which provides Hungarian businesses opportunities in 
certain niche sectors was therefore important, and the SDG negotiations could be used to 
build Hungary’s image as a country with significant expertise in these sectors (OBS#01). 
This motivation also clearly links to the Global Opening strategy and its explicit emphasis on 
reinvigorating economic ties with the developing world.  
While the importance of water for sustainable development was hardly a controversial issue, 
giving the topic ample visibility through a dedicated SDG was by no means given. Water was 
after all only one part of Goal 7 (Ensure environmental sustainability) during the MDGs, and 
there have been a number of proposals which would have given water issues a less visible 
role (see e.g. Sustainable Development Solutions Network 2012). Indeed, a technical 
summary prepared for the OWG reviewed several proposals for integrating water issues into 
the SDGs, and found that they could be placed into two broad categories: either integrating 
all ‘social, economic and environmental dimensions of the water challenge in one single SDG 
on water’, or having different water-related issues included in different goals (TST Issue 
Brief 2013: 5-6). The third session of the OWG in May 2013 was the first time when the 
issue of water was discussed, and countries seemed divided on which option they preferred. 
The EU for example stated on this session that it and its member states ‘remain open on the 
option of having one goal on water and sanitation with several targets’ (European Union 
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2013), however a previous Commission communication (European Commission 2013; TST 
Issue Brief 2013: 6) seemed to endorse the option of mainstreaming water issues into several 
different goals. 
Hungarian diplomats clearly needed to come up with a strategy on how to secure water issues 
as an independent SDG. The paper proceeds by examining how Hungary made use of the 
three small state strategies, bargaining and alliance building, normative suasion, and 
reputation building to ensure this. 
 
4.2. Bargaining and alliance building 
Hungary engaged in little explicit individual bargaining during the OWG process, which 
corresponds to the predictions of the literature on small states. However, there seems to have 
been a clear strategy of building alliances behind the scenes, especially during the preparatory 
work, well before the OWG actually began. In 2010, the Hungarian government appointed an 
experienced career diplomat for the position of Permanent Representative of Hungary to the 
UN in New York, Csaba Kőrösi (United Nations 2010), with a clear mandate of raising 
Hungary’s profile at the organization, in line with the Global Opening policy (OBS#01). The 
ambassador saw through a bid, initiated by the previous government, for one of the non-
permanent seats in the UN Security Council for the year 2012 in the Eastern Europe Group. 
While this ultimately failed in the October 2011 vote, Hungary remained active in other, less 
visible UN forums (INT#03). 
The most important such forum in terms of gathering support for a water SDG was the 
Friends of Water group, established in 2010 by the Permanent Mission of Tajikistan.6 The 
group, an informal voluntary association of likeminded countries in promotion of the UN 
water agenda, initially had 15 members with little visible activities, and in fact an interviewee 
argued that until 2012 it existed only on paper (INT#04). Hungary joined this group in the 
run-up to the Rio+20 conference in 2012, and together with Finland, Tajikistan and Thailand 
became a member of its steering committee, with the aim of developing a clear push for the 
discussion of water-related issues at the conference. The group had five thematic discussions 
in 2012, two of them organized by the Hungarian Permanent Representation.7 These 
workshops culminated in a non-paper and a set of recommendations for the Rio+20 
conference (Friends of Water 2012a). As a result of its more visible activities, the 
membership of the group quickly began to grow, and by the start of the OWG negotiations in 
March 2013 there were more than 100 countries involved. 
There is evidence that Hungary used its leading role in this group to build an alliance for the 
support of its own priority of water issues during the OWG, which became especially clear in 
2013: Hungary put strong diplomatic efforts into organizing the Budapest Water Summit in 
                                            
6 Other groups which Hungary joined included the Sustainable Energy for All Group, the Accessible and 
Sustainable Financing for Everyone Group and the Culture in Sustainable Development Group. 
7 ‘Water related risk management – the impact of human intervention on water’ in February 2012, and ‘Water in 
MDG’s’ in April 2012. 
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October 2013 to further cement the alliance. While this was not officially a UN-event, it did 
include UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon among its keynote speakers, as well as several 
high level representatives of UN agencies and member states, making it a high profile 
conference. The conference issued a lengthy statement, mainly emphasizing the importance 
of water, and also included specific recommendations for an SDG on water and its contents 
(Budapest Water Summit 2013a). According to an interviewee, these recommendations fit 
very well with the interests of Hungary, and they were deliberately formulated in a way that 
would make their subsequent transfer to the ongoing OWG negotiations relatively easy, even 
though the statement was not an official UN document (INT#04). 
Hungary therefore joined, and played a key role in revitalizing the Friends of Water group 
through actively organizing and hosting its meetings, and later a high profile summit to build 
a broad alliance for an SDG on water. With more than 100 countries joining the group and 
high profile attendance at the Budapest Water Summit, the country was able to present the 
recommendations from the summit as a consensus of all participating countries. These 
recommendations could then be channelled directly into the OWG negotiations. 
 
4.3. Normative suasion 
As outlined in section 2, normative suasion only works if the country is able to put forward 
well formulated, technically sound proposals. It was striking how silent the Hungarian 
government was in terms of presenting arguments directly to the OWG on how it would like 
the SDGs to evolve more specifically, and why this would be desirable from a sustainable 
development perspective. Representatives of the Hungarian government did not submit any 
statements to the OWG, and no negotiation documents presenting Hungarian interests were 
ever published, aside from a questionnaire which all participating members needed to fill out 
and was made available on the UN website (Mission of Hungary 2013). In this, Hungary 
emphasized the familiar need of including ‘water and integrated water management’ among 
the goals, as well as a number of highly general principles and some red lines, but hardly any 
other specific priorities (INT#05). As a comparison, other relatively new donors submitted 
several statements to the OWG: South Korea submitted 17, and Poland 25.  
There are two possible explanations as to why the Hungarian government was silent in 
putting well-developed proposals forward which would aim at convincing others on the 
merits of including water issues as a separate goal.  
First, lack of capacities within the MFA and the wider Hungarian government can be 
mentioned. The literature argues that the Hungarian development department in the MFA had 
low staff numbers and a relative lack of detailed knowledge about development issues due to 
high staff turnover (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot 2015). This weakened the ability of the 
Hungarian government to influence issues in the EU’s development policy making. While an 
experienced diplomat and former ambassador was charged within the MFA with coordinating 
the SDG process between the line ministries and liaising with Kőrösi in New York, he was 
given little administrative support (INT#07; INT#08). NGOs also had little capacities to 
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engage in the process and support the MFA, as most of their work during the time was 
focused on the new international development strategy (INT#07; INT#09).  
With only limited guidance from Budapest and limited substantial input from domestic actors 
such as NGOs, the role of the co-chair might have been intentionally neutralized. 
Ambassador Kőrösi argued publicly that in his role as co-chair he was required to act as a 
neutral arbiter and not as a promoter of Hungarian interests (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade 2014). This role conception makes engaging in normative suasion strategies difficult, 
but it is questionable whether it is the correct way of understanding the role of the co-chair. 
There is no such specification in the document describing the methods of work of the OWG 
(General Assembly 2013), or the procedures and rules of the General Assembly. Emphasizing 
the neutrality of the co-chair role may be seen as a tactic which enabled a visible position for 
Hungary while also masking the fact that the country was potentially unable to be active in 
the negotiations and engage in normative suasion due to a lack of capacities. 
The second explanation however would argue that while Hungary did not individually engage 
in normative suasion during the OWG, it engaged in normative suasion collectively through 
the Friends of Water group and the Budapest Water Summit. The Summit’s closing statement 
(2013a) is a scientifically and technically sound account on the importance of water and why 
giving the issue of water a large emphasis is essential for any sustainable development 
strategy. The statement can clearly be seen as a document aimed to persuade the reader, and it 
is possible that Hungary saw it as sufficient and perhaps more effective to convince the 
members of the OWG (INT#04). Engaging in such collective normative suasion might have 
also been seen by Hungarian diplomats as a way to make up for limited domestic capacities. 
The two explanations on the lack of individual normative suasion strategies are not 
contradictory, and can indeed complement each other. The following section turns to 
discussing the usage of the third small state strategy, reputation building.  
 
4.4. Reputation building 
Reputation building seems to have been the strategy the Hungarian government relied on 
most extensively to achieve influence in the OWG, and these strategies also link strongly to 
the motivations of Hungary for selecting the topic of water. This strategy had two 
components: (1) the co-chair role, with Hungary acting as an impartial mediator who is able 
to present solutions, consolidate different national perspectives and channel the voices of 
technical experts and global civil society into the process; and (2) branding itself as a 
technical expert on water issues who cannot be ignored in negotiations on the topic. 
Considering its low involvement in UN matters previously, Hungary’s election as a co-chair 
can be seen as somewhat unexpected. Interviewees argued however that it was the 
culmination of a long, behind the scenes process, as well as a number of chance elements 
(INT#01; INT#05; INT#06). An important element in this process was the country’s activity 
in the Friends of Water group, which had contributed not only to creating an alliance in 
support of an SDG on water, but also to building the country’s reputation among its fellow 
UN members, and mainly among developing countries (INT#04). 
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The strategy for leading the negotiations of the two co-chairs relied on framing the talks as 
technical as long as possible, and avoiding politicized positions and political clashes along 
the North–South divide familiar in the UN (Rohonyi 2015). Independent think tanks and 
scientists were involved in the process to give credibility to the negotiation summaries made 
by the co-chairs, and counter political interests of member states masked as technical 
positions. Countries were explicitly asked to focus on facts and not repeat political mandates. 
The structure of the negotiations, which got countries to work together in small and often 
diverse groups of twos and threes, and to find a compromise among themselves before 
presenting that to the OWG also allowed a greater scope for channelling technical expertise 
into the negotiations. This strategy, focusing on avoiding politics and harnessing technical 
expertise seemed to work, as political ‘horse-trading’ was delayed to the last month of the 
OWG, but by then the participants had a strong basis to work on which reflected the technical 
and scientific state of the art (INT#04; INT#10).  
The two co-chairs thus followed a strategy of focusing on technical aspects of sustainable 
development, delaying politics, and forcing countries to compromise along the technical 
aspects. The activity of the co-chairs has received a significant degree of international 
acclaim both from governments and civil society (INT#10), with some voices noting that they 
have had an especially difficult task in creating a consensus outcome document, and the fact 
that they have achieved it is an ‘amazing’ accomplishment (Global Landscapes Community 
2014). 
In terms of establishing itself as an expert on water-related issues, Hungary already clearly 
expressed its affiliation with the topic about a decade ago with its first concept note on 
international development cooperation in 2003, and has attempted to raise this profile during 
its EU Presidency in the first half of 2011, when it declared water management and sanitation 
as priority topics. The activities in the Friends of Water Group, and the Budapest Water 
Summit can also be seen as reputation building exercises. In an interview, ambassador Kőrösi 
talked about the country’s participation in the OWG process as a branding exercise, with the 
goal of portraying Hungary as a proponent of sustainable development and an expert on water 
issues (Rohonyi 2015: 24). 
Hungary therefore built a reputation for itself as a technical expert on water issues, who is not 
driven by political or other motivations and is thus able to lead the negotiations in an 
unbiased way. Just how much Hungary really is an expert on water issues is secondary, the 
important thing is the reputation created through rhetoric and diplomatic actions. Indeed, the 
amount of resources spent on the sector in Hungary’s bilateral development efforts remained 
almost negligible throughout the past years: in 2012 for example, Hungary funded only 7 
water-related development projects abroad with a total value of $370,000 (out of a total 
bilateral development budget of $21.7 million, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). In 
2012, the government closed down the Environmental and Water Management Research 
Institute, a flagship institute in Hungary on water management issues since 1952, which has 
been extensively involved in international development cooperation projects and held 
unparalleled expertise on the topic in Hungary (see Vituki s.a.). These steps clearly do not 
reflect the government’s rhetoric about its commitment to water issues. 
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The Hungarian government has done much to communicate how successful it has been as the 
co-chair of the OWG, and how this increased the country’s reputation. In a press conference 
in July 2014, the MFA’s spokesperson argued that the proposal by the OWG is a significant 
diplomatic success for Hungary, showing that the country is capable of leading high profile 
international negotiations. She also emphasized that once the working group’s 
recommendations were finalized, ‘members of the group gave a standing ovation for the 
Hungarian government, which is a huge achievement for the country’ (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 2014). The more active role Hungary played in the UN was portrayed as 
evidence of the success of the Global Opening strategy, as it is increasing Hungary’s 
international reputation, which would eventually transform into business opportunities and 
Hungarian jobs.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The paper aimed at examining the role of Hungary in the process of drafting the Sustainable 
Development Goals, with a particular emphasis on the country’s motivations, priorities and 
actions in the Open Working Group, which it co-chaired together with Kenya. Co-chairing 
the OWG fit well with the Hungarian government’s strategic goal of an economic opening 
towards developing countries and more active role at the UN. Hungary formulated clear, 
although relatively narrow interests it sought to achieve with the negotiations, the inclusion of 
an SDG on water, which was seen as beneficial for Hungarian business interests. In order to 
achieve this goal and be influential in the negotiations, Hungary needed to compensate for the 
structural disadvantages it has as a small state through a combination of small state 
negotiation strategies. It used various forums and initiatives to build an alliance for an SDG 
on water, and focused on acting as an effective and neutral mediator in the role of the co-
chair of the OWG. However, capacities for normative suasion strategies remained low. The 
final outcome of the OWG process, especially in the field of water, correlated with Hungary’s 
interests, meaning that in the paper’s understanding of influence, Hungary was successful. 
We accept that the definition of influence used in the paper can only account for a correlation 
between interests and outcomes, and we do not fully trace the actual process of Hungary 
achieving influence. While it is possible to argue that a similar OWG outcome could have 
happened without Hungary’s active involvement, it is difficult to conceive that the actions of 
the Hungarian government discussed in this paper did not play at least a catalysing role. 
Given the limitations small states face in international negotiations, the final OWG outcome 
should be seen a substantial “win” for Hungary. 
The case of Hungary’s influence in the SDG process indeed illustrates that small states can be 
have an impact on multilateral negotiations in the UN. While the framework of Panke (2010) 
adopted in this paper has originally focused on the EU, the paper has shown that it has strong 
explanatory power in case of the special UN setting of the OWG. The case shows that much 
of Hungary’s success was achieved despite a lack of significant support from government 
bodies. While the government saw the SDG negotiations as an important vehicle to build 
Hungary’s image among developing countries, it was striking that it did not really increase 
capacities in the MFA and even dissolved capacities elsewhere. Thus, a key emerging 
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theoretical finding is that small state counterbalancing strategies can be successful even 
without strong capacities, if they invest strongly into ‘branding’ themselves through 
bargaining and reputation building – although clearly much depends on the specific issue. 
Things might have been very different had Hungary chosen more controversial aims than the 
inclusion of water among the SDGs.  
The case also illustrates how the motivations of donors influence the norms of the 
international development system. Hungary did not champion the cause of water management 
for altruistic reasons, but because it perceived the creation of an international development 
framework which featured water issues strongly to lead to potential business benefits for 
Hungarian companies in the future. In this regard the Hungarian perception as a ‘leader’ in 
this field and its perceived ability to bring value added from its experience is important and 
adds weight to the conclusion that small states can ‘increase their status via socially creative 
means’ (Crandall and Varov 2016, 4). This underlines the importance of analyzing the 
specific, underlying interests of more developed countries when looking at processes of norm 
creation in international development.  
Last but not least, the paper illustrates that new development actors from Central and Eastern 
Europe are much more active in the international development system than previously 
thought. The literature has tended to conceptualize these states as rather passive in 
multilateral development forums, but there might be a need to rethink this approach in light 
of Hungary’s rather active participation in the SDG negotiations. An examination of how the 
roles played by new donors in international development negotiations have evolved over time 
may be needed. 
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